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Gesturing Towards Definition: Passing Thoughts on Lack 
and the Phallus 
Susannah Bredenkamp 
The problem of defining masculinity has plagued masculinity studies since its 
inception. Attempts at definition have been seen as either too vague, incom- 
plete, or unable to account for the way men live and experience masculinity. 
This paper explores these difficulties and the problems of a 'content-based' def- 
inition of masculinity. I trace the way in which people seek to 'pass' as mascu- 
line and the origins of masculinity in nineteenth-century studies of biological 
difference. I argue that masculinity must be defined discursively, and that this 
definition bears striking similarities to Lacan's concept of the phallus. I argue, 
further, that masculinity, as it is lived, is a state of hybridity, the result of colo- 
nization by the phallus. 
The difficulty of defining masculinity is widely discussed within masculin- 
ity studies. Jeff Hearn notes the "variety of uses of the concept, [and] the 
imprecision of its use in many cases,"' while Kenneth Clatterbaugh writes that 
it "may well be the best-kept secret of the literature on masculinities that we 
have an extremely ill-defined idea of what we are talking abo~ t . "~  One solution 
to this problem would involve understanding 'masculinities' as the varieties of 
gender expressions of men, a move which avoids the need to define the content 
of masculinity. For this reason, Hearn has suggested that it would be more 
appropriate "to base analysis on the concept of 'men' and what men do or think 
or feel," thereby taking the focus away from 'masculinity' alt~gether.~ 
Similarly, Clatterbaugh argues that the term 'masculinities,' as it is used in mas- 
culinity studies, is a "~ubterfuge,"~ which is already a way to talk about men, 
and that an acknowledgement of this fact (in view of our inability to agree on a 
definition of 'masculinity') would "at least guard against the m h e r  mystifica- 
tion of it."s From a feminist perspective, I must wonder whether anything new 
may be gained by speaking of the experiences of men in this way, and especial- 
ly whether the analysis of men's experiences in the context of masculinity stud- 
ies does not serve to reinscribe masculinity as a natural, yet unexamined, 
domain accessible only by certain (privileged) male bodies. 
It is not necessarily problematic to study gender in relation to male bodies 
or to study the way that men 'do' gender. What is problematic is the associa- 
tion, however implicit, between male bodies and masculinity. This association 
runs the risk of misunderstanding the gender expression of feminine homosex- 
ual men, male-to-female transgendered persons, and men who are androgynous. 
In the context of 'masculinity,' these gender expressions by or through male 
bodies can be seen as a failure. To attempt to subsume these men and their gen- 
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der expressions in a study of men's experiences, or within the range of 'mas- 
culinities' expressed by male bodies, is to force an understanding of the people 
in question which they may not hold of themselves; when these people may not 
think of themselves as masculine, or even male. Taking the focus away from 
masculinity, and placing it on 'men,' also fails to account for and address the 
feminization of black men: Jewish men,' and other "adjectival masculinities"" 
throughout history. Discussing the gender expressions of black or Jewish men 
in the context of 'men's experiences' or 'masculinities' allows us to forget that 
black and Jewish male bodies were seen as inferior, feminized, and not really 
male until well into the twentieth century. It was not a failure to live up to a 
white, Anglo-Saxon, heterosexual standard of gendered behaviour that was at 
issue in the association of these men with femininity or the female. On the con- 
trary, it was a failure of the body itself-a failure to live up to 'maleness.' 
Viewed in this way, de-emphasizing 'masculinity' in an attempt to focus on the 
male is not, as Clatterbaugh suggests, a de-mystification at all. There is an un- 
examined assumption here that we know what 'male' is, what a man is, and it 
is an assumption which fails to take into account the mutually constitutive rela- 
tionship between gender and the body, especially as it is demonstrated in the 
excellent work done within current gender theory9 and by feminist deconstruc- 
tionists in biology"' and the history of science." The consequence of the con- 
tinued mystification of 'maleness' is not only the exclusion of "female mas- 
~ulinity"'~ from the study of 'men's behaviour,' but also the erasure of intersex- 
uality." 
The final criticism of studying men returns us to the need for a definition 
of masculinity. If we recognize that gender expression is not necessarily tied to 
biologicaVmorphological sex and that we do not only lack a definition of mas- 
culinity, but that our understanding of 'maleness' is historically and culturally 
specific, i.e. that the bodies of homosexual men, Jewish men, black men and 
others have not always been included in the category 'male,' then we are forced 
to consider the relationship between masculinity/maleness and the way in 
which power (whether political, economic, scientific-discursive, or social) is 
distributed and accessed. In short, if certain rights and kinds of access have 
been denied to a variety of classed, raced, and sexed bodies based on their fail- 
ure to approximate either maleness or masculinity, then to know the definition 
of masculinity is to know the condition of access to power. Further, if much of 
the work in masculinity studies has focused on what Clatterbaugh calls 'adjec- 
tival masculinities,' such as "Jewish . . . Black . . . Chicano . . . [and] gay mas- 
~ulinit[ies],"'~ we must ask what makes these masculinities 'adjectival?' How 
do we know that they are 'alternate' examples of masculinity at all, if we have 
no definition of masculinity? And, most importantly, is the designation of these 
'masculinities' as adjectival or alternative not just another way of prohibiting 
access to 'true'lnon-adjectival masculinity or maleness? 
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The most influential definition of masculinity, and also the most widely 
cited and debated" within masculinity studies, is R. W. Connell's formulation. 
According to Connell, "hegemonic masculinity . . . is the configuration of gen- 
der practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of 
the legitimacy of patriarchy [and] which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) 
the dominant position of men and the subordination of women."I6 Connell goes 
on to say that hegemonic masculinity is not necessarily embodied and that the 
bearers of hegemonic masculinity "may be exemplars, such as film actors, or 
even fantasy figures, such as film characters."" Margaret Wetherell and Nigel 
Edley criticize Connell's definition, based on the fact that "the impossibility or 
fantastic nature of hegemonic masculinity is one of its defining features."18 
They write that the definition is "vague" and "imprecise"" and does not tell us 
anything about how men live masculinity. Connell himself seems unclear about 
the relationship between his definition and masculinity as it is lived, or, rather, 
power as it attaches to bodies as a consequence of masculinity. He writes that 
"it is the successful claim to authority . . . that is the mark of hegemony," but 
adds: "this is not to say that the most visible bearers of hegemonic masculini- 
ty are always the most powerful people" and that "individual holders of institu- 
tional power or great wealth may be far from the hegemonic pattern in their per- 
sonal l i ~ e s . ' ' ~ ~  He insists that men who do not live up to the definition still reap 
the benefits of hegemonic masculinity, but also that some men are subordinat- 
ed by other men, because of hegemonic ma~culinity.~' This is a lot of work for 
one definition to do: how is hegemonic masculinity a 'gender practice' if it is 
nowhere embodied? More importantly, if the embodiment of hegemonic mas- 
culinity is not a guarantee of power and, conversely, power is not wielded only 
by those who are hegemonically masculine, how is it possible that the success- 
ful claim to authority is the mark of hegemony? Further, if some men reap the 
benefits of patriarchy without embodying hegemonic masculinity, yet mascu- 
line embodiment is not the factor that distinguishes between the beneficiaries 
and the subordinated, how does hegemonic masculinity guarantee the dominant 
position of men (over women or other men)? These are the questions with 
which this paper seeks to engage. 
It is worth acknowledging that a variety of different behaviours, traits etc. 
may be valorized, validated, supported or encouraged within any given subcul- 
ture or section of the population, and may be called 'masculinity' within a given 
group. The differences in behaviour which are expected from people who are 
seen to be morphologically andtor biologically male may well range, for exam- 
ple, from scholarly intellectualism to brute strength and athleticism. Any num- 
ber of other factors might form the basis for judging whether an individual is 
'masculine' (or, more accurately, whether they are behaving in an ideal or 
appropriate way for someone who is perceived to be 'male') within their own 
profession, class, or community (be that based on location, religion, ethnicity, 
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interest etc.). Whether or not these 'masculinities' are experienced as complete 
and functional within these communities, how they are supported or perpetuat- 
ed and how they translate outside of their contexts is not the focus of this arti- 
cle. There has been extensive research done within masculinity studies on this 
topic, typically from a cross-cultural, sub-cultural, post-colonial or historical 
perspective and typically talking about 'masculinities' or 'alternative masculin- 
ity.'" The problem that I mentioned in my introduction, however, still persists: 
in upholding the notion of 'masculinities,' 'alternative masculinity' or 'mas- 
culinity' (as it is lived) as somehow distinct from or contrary to the unattainable 
hegemonic masculinity, we are in danger of accepting that any behaviour which 
is exhibited by, or expected from men is 'masculine.' This acceptance rests on 
an assumption that we know what a man is and that there is a necessary relation 
between 'maleness' and 'masculinity.' Moreover, it leaves the biological/mor- 
phological category 'male' unexamined and makes it the foundation for 'mas- 
culinity' (i.e. we know that the behaviour is 'masculine,' because the body is 
'male'). It is my belief that this kind of passive analysis brings us no closer to 
an understanding of masculinity. 
Passing 
Connell's definition of hegemonic masculinity is based on the function of the 
term (to legitimate patriarchy and subordinate women), but it tells us nothing 
about the content of hegemonic masculinity. Michael Kimmel, in an attempt to 
expand on Connell's definition, cites Erving Goffman's definition of the "one 
complete, unblushing male" in American culture: "a young, married, white, 
urban, northern heterosexual, Protestant father of college education, fully 
employed, of good complexion, weight and height, and a recent record in 
sports.. This is not, however, the definition that men give of masculinity, 
when asked to describe it. Wetherell and Edley, in a study which explored 
Connell's definition, asked men to define masculinity and to discuss the extent 
to which they embodied their own definition. They found that men defined 
masculinity in the stereotypical ways "usually attributed to hegemonic mas- 
culinity (strength, boldness, winning challenges.. .),"24 but that this definition 
was "not the principal method by which the men interviewed constructed them- 
selves as ma~culine."~~ As Clatterbaugh notes, "masculinity . . . is identified 
with the stereotype or the norm . . . [but] the obvious difficulty in talking about 
ideas and norms is that we are not talking about actual traits; we are talking 
instead about beliefs about these . . ."26 and not about gender roles. It is to be 
wondered whether the stereotypical definition of hegemonic masculinity is a 
definition of masculinity at all, if it has no bearing on whether people see them- 
selves as masculine and if it cannot function as a standard which allows us to 
judge whether someone is masculine or not. Clearly, a different approach to the 
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project of definition is needed, so I will approach the problem through the 
process known as 'passing.' If people who believe themselves to be masculine 
are simultaneously unable to explain why or how they are so, 'passing' allows 
us to see what people who are not sufficiently male/masculine have to do in 
order to succeed at masculinity. As Sara Ahmed writes, passing renders identi- 
ty as the following: 
[an] object that can be known, seen and approximated. If I desired to pass for 
a particular other, I can imagine myself saying: 'Look, this is what you are, 
so I will become you. I will move, talk, eat, smell and be like you. By adopt- 
ing your dress and manner, I will pass for you.' The subject who seeks to pass 
may assume the knowability of the place of the other.27 
It is therefore in the place of the 'other' that 1 will begin my search for the def- 
inition of masculinity. 
Passing, Elaine K. Ginsberg notes, "has been applied discursively to dis- 
guises of . . . elements of an individual's presumed 'natural' or 'essential' iden- 
tity, including class, ethnicity, and ~exuality,"'~ but its specific origins lie with 
race, specifically with "the discourse of racial difference and . . . the assumption 
of a fraudulent 'white' identity by an individual culturally and legally defined 
as 'Negro' or black."29 As such, racial passing is usually understood as possi- 
ble only when someone who is legally black has a skin tone light enough to pre- 
vent the visual discovery of their 'true' race. In this way, passing is made pos- 
sible through "the false promise of the visible as an epistemological guaran- 
tee"30 and necessitates a "face, voice, skin color [and] body type . . . that defies 
or confounds easy profiling."" According to this view, the only way for some- 
one who is black to pass as white is to actually be white (physically, if not legal- 
ly), but passing, it turns out, is more complex than that. 
Frantz Fanon wrote that "the black is not a man . . . the black is a black 
man."32 This statement clearly illustrates that the state of being 'adjectival' with 
respect to maleness or masculinity is not merely one of difference, but of infe- 
riority Because of his race, the black man is not seen as being completely and 
unproblematically male. It would follow, then, that passing as a man would 
only be possible through becoming literally white, through the circumstance of 
being born with light skin. With respect to a definition of masculinity, we can 
say that hegemonic masculinity is always white. However, Fanon's extended 
meditation on the topic, in Black Skin, White Masks, has more to tell us about 
how to pass as white, and therefore male. "The Negro of the Antilles," he 
writes, "will be proportionately whiter-that is, he will come closer to being a 
real human being-in direct relation to his mastery of the French language."" 
A black man may also be "white above a certain financial leveP4 and "one is 
white as one is rich, as one is beautiful, as one is intelligent."35 Fanon relates 
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one incident when he managed to 'pass,' despite his skin colour, based on his 
success in one of these areas: 
Rather more than a year ago in Lyon, I remember, in a lecture I had drawn a 
parallel between Negro and European poetry, and a French acquaintance told 
me enthusiastically, 'At bottom you are a white man.' The fact that I had been 
able to investigate so interesting a problem through the white man's language 
gave me honorary citizenship.'" 
I am not suggesting that Fanon's display of intelligence and eloquence on an 
academic topic had caused his acquaintance to forget that he was black, or even 
that his blackness had ceased to matter. In that moment, however, the colour of 
his skin became less salient in his acquaintance's reading of his identity. 
Through an exceptional display of the characteristics typically associated with 
white masculinity, Fanon's blackness ceased to be the determining feature of 
his 'essence'-in that moment he was only black because of his skin colour 
and, but for his skin colour, he was a (white) man. Richard Dyer notes that ref- 
erence to a truer or deeper white essence is a common practice when distin- 
guishing a black man who 'passes' because of his eloquence or intelligence (i.e. 
his 'white' behaviour or character), from other black people: "Bastide provides 
a striking example . . . when a Negro is accepted, one often says, in order to sep- 
arate him from the rest of his race, 'He is a Negro, of course, but his soul is 
~hite." '~'  Fanon sees this kind of passing, despite visibility, as a kind of con- 
tract. In a discussion of Rene Maran's Un homme pareil a m  autres, Fanon 
notes that the black man who passes is asked to agree to "one condition": 
'You have nothing in common with real Negroes. You are not black, you are 
'extremely brown." This procedure is quite familiar to colored students in 
France. Society refuses to consider them genuine Negroes. The Negro is a 
savage, whereas the student is civilized. 'You're 'us' . . . and if anyone thinks 
you are a Negro he is mistaken, because you merely look like one.'38 
In this way, the 'white' characteristics displayed by the black man remain 
'white' characteristics. The black man who succeeds at defying the expecta- 
tions people have held of him based on his race is not even taken as an 'excep- 
tional' example of blackness. Instead, his visibility as black is supplanted by a 
deeper and more essential 'whiteness'-which accounts for his departure from 
racial stereotypes-thereby leaving those stereotypes intact. It is for this rea- 
son that I wish to insist that the process I have been describing is, however 
counter-intuitively, 'passing.' That it is, in effect, passing in full view. Based 
on this discussion of passing by black men, we can add not only whiteness but 
also wealth, an eloquent command of language, and high intelligence to the def- 
inition of hegemonic masculinity. These are the features which may allow a 
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black man access to full personhood, to a non-adjectival maleness or masculin- 
ity. 
Jewish men have long been associated with a constitutional femaleness. 
Sander L. Gilman shows how nineteenth- and early-twentieth century accounts 
of the Jewish character drew from simultaneously circulating stereotypes about 
women, such as having "no sense of humour," exhibiting "a want of depth" and 
being "materiali~tic."~~ The conflation of male Jews with women, however, was 
more than behavioural. Jewish men were believed not only to be prone to 
'female' diseases, such as hysteria,"" but were also thought, until the seventeenth 
century, to men~huate.~' In this case, 'passing' by Jewish men is akin to a trans- 
gender or transsexual passing-passing from a purported female embodiment 
to that of the male. Athleticism is one way in which this is accomplished, but, 
paradoxically, this is not because of their supposed femininity, but because of 
an overwhelming intellectuality. Where intellectualism allows Fanon, as a 
black man, at least a contextual access to hegemonic masculinity, it precludes it 
for the Jewish man. Gilman describes how the stereotype of the intellectual, 
and therefore physically weak, Jew was attributed by Jewish psychiatrists in 
America in the 1920s to 'social' rather than 'biological' heredity, and resulted 
in an attempt to produce the "all-American athlete" through 
sports and play . . . [which] form an incomparable avenue of discharge for 
nervous tension . . . [Psychiatrists added that] circumstances excluded the Jew 
from their wholesome influence, and the children of the race grew up to be 
very serious, very earnest, too early devoted to mature efforts, excessively 
cerebral in their activities, and not sufficiently strenuous phy~ically.~~ 
This stereotype is still in existence, as Bomstein notes: "intellectual Jewish 
boys like me who were clumsy, fat and not good at sports were not 'real' boys, 
not in the Christian All-American community I grew up in."43 The very physi- 
cal ability that defines the black man, dissociates him from intellectuality, and 
keeps him from accessing hegemonic masculinity allows the Jewish man entry 
into that same category. It would be inadequate to conclude that hegemonic 
masculinity involves both a degree of athleticism and a degree of intellectuali- 
ty (although this is undoubtedly so). What we should realize, based on a com- 
parison of the two kinds of passing discussed thus far, is that a mere listing of 
the traits associated with hegemonic masculinity does not produce a satisfacto- 
ry definition. We still do not know to what degree someone needs to possess or 
exhibit a specific trait in order to qualify as 'masculine' or what balance of these 
traits constitutes the ideal. Further, it seems that access to masculinity as based 
on these traits is differential. A black man who displays any athleticism puts his 
intellectuality and his masculinity in question, while a Jewish man who displays 
intellectuality runs the same risk. What it takes to succeed or pass as male is 
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based not on living up to a standard but is the result of a negotiation between 
each particular body and its perceived or attributed lack. 
I have not been concerned, in my discussion of passing by Jewish men, 
with the modification of physical c(1)ues. There have, of course, been many 
attempts to describe the physical markers of Jewi~hness,~~ but, for the purposes 
of this paper, I am more interested in the fact that these attempts have often 
failed. Dyer writes that Gilman 
details the tradition of representing Jews in terms of physiognomic difference, 
including skin, eye and hair colour. However, as he notes, there was a coun- 
tervailing tendency, which argued that Jews in fact varied in appearance 
according to geography. Scientists began to demonstrate that Jews were 'the 
adaptive people par excellence' (1991: 177). Already in 1787 Samuel 
Stanhope had argued thus: 'In Britain and Germany they are fair, brown in 
France and in Turkey, swarthy in Portugal and Spain, olive in Syria and 
Chaldea, tawny or copper-coloured in Arabia and Egypt.'45 
It is for this reason that the very ease with which Jews were supposed to pass 
became inscribed as a marker of biological difference. Daniel Itzkovitz writes 
that the "notion of shape-shifting and the performance of an identity other than 
'one's own"' became a characteristic of Jewish difference in the early twentieth 
century. "Jews, it was commonly claimed, were a 'chameleonic race' whose 
veins coursed with ... 'strange chameleonic Jewish The "use of 
'blood' (in the phrase 'chameleonic blood')," Itzkovitz notes, "betrays a desire 
common to many writers of the period to fix the Jew by using a discourse of 
difference that would posit Jewish identity as somehow essential and 
immutable . . . [but] the most common 'fixation' of Jewishness was accom- 
plished, paradoxically, through the notion of chamele~nisrn."~~ This meant that 
"the Jew was most Jewish . . . when not Jewish"48 and that "the 'natural place' 
of the Jew is in passing."49 This is a notion that completely overturns any com- 
mon-sense understanding of passing. Brooke Kroeger writes that "it is passing 
when people effectively present themselves as other than who they understand 
themselves to be. Effectively is the key, because an ineffectual effort to pass is 
just that, a failed attempt."50 In the case of Jewish passing, this is not at all true. 
While visibility, in Fanon's case, did not preclude his passing, in the Jew's case, 
invisibility does not guarantee successful passing. Passing is, in fact, the mark- 
er of Jewish difference and identity-rather than its successful concealment. I 
will return to this paradox, and its consequences for a definition of masculini- 
ty, at a later stage. 
If the requirements of hegemonic masculinity are always to be discerned in 
relation to an individual's own lack (albeit attributed through any number of 
stereotypes), and if passing is the way in which that lack is either hidden or 
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made less salient, then FTM (female to male) passing should be especially illus- 
trative in defining masculinity. Who, after all, would have more to conceal, 
more physical cues to modify, and a greater distance to traverse toward 'male- 
ness' than someone who is biologically female? Perhaps, on the other hand, the 
problem of FTM passing appears as a relatively simple one: hide the obvious- 
ly female body parts successfully and passing is accomplished. Passing, as we 
have seen, however, is rarely that simple. Intellectualism, rather than race, pro- 
vided a means for black men to pass, while athleticism performed the same 
function for Jewish men. Similar processes are at work in FTM passing. As is 
to be expected, much of what is required for FTMs to pass involves the modi- 
fication of physical cues. My discussion of FTM passing draws on suggestions 
compiled at a website entitled "FTM Passing  tip^."^' The site advises that "a 
flatter chest is an important part of presenting as male" and that "many women 
have light-coloured 'peach fuzz,' but men don't, so shave it off." In addition, 
it is important to "make sure your trousers fit low and aren't tight-this helps 
to hide both your hips and your waist." Passing is also aided by "wearing tall 
shoes, or shoes with lifts" and "bodybuilding [which] can make a difference in 
getting your body to take on a more male shape."52 Height and a reasonable 
degree of musculature, then, are also part of what constitutes physical maleness. 
It is certainly true that women are, on average, shorter than men and that body- 
building can broaden shoulders and narrow hips, thereby concealing female- 
ness. On the other hand, it is clearly an ideal male body which is approximat- 
ed here. Being short and lacking muscle are circumstances which make pass- 
ing more difficult-as with Fanon's intellectuality, an extreme demonstration of 
the hegemonic ideal is required in order to pass. The indisputable performance 
of hegemonic maleness is, at least when clothed, defined physically by a flat 
chest, tallness, and muscularity. 
The modification of physical cues is only a small part of FTM Passing. In 
terms of hairstyle and dress, the website advises methods which emphasize a 
conservative or middle-class self-presentation: "go for a short back and sides 
cut, but avoid getting an all-over crewcut or 'punk' style . . . ask for a 'tradition- 
al men's cut,"' and "dress more conservatively-you might want to leave the 
motorcycle jacket at home for a while."53 Instead, FTMs should "start with an 
ironed button-down shirt, worn with pressed khakis, dress slacks, or neat-look- 
ing blue or black jeans" and "ties are, of course, a great way to pass."54 
Masculinity is middle-class and, in the case of FTMs, it is, again, an extreme 
version of the ideal which facilitates passing. In a discussion of perhaps the 
most famous case of FTM passing, that of Brandon Teena, Judith Halberstam 
writes that Brandon's self-presentation must be read . . . as a damaging critique 
of the white working-class masculinities around him . . . His performance of 
courtly masculinity [was] a shrewd deployment of the middle-class and so- 
called 'respectable' masculinities that represent an American romantic ideal of 
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manhood."55 Ginsberg notes that "Brandon's passing was convincing enough 
that, even after the local law enforcement officers and some angry men exposed 
him, both legally and litcrally, women still insisted that he was 'one of the 
nicest men' they had ever met and the 'best boyfriend' they had ever dated."56 
Halberstam clearly attributes this success, at least in part, to Brandon's perform- 
ance of middle-class masculinity. As in the case of black passing, where race 
is made less salient by intellectuality, here sex is made less salient by class. 
In addition to a tall, muscular body and a middle-class identity, hegemon- 
ic masculinity can be defined by a vague category of behaviour which I will call 
"deportment." Kroeger writes that "passers make an art of appearing in all 
respects-speech, gestures, attitudes, conversation, mannerisms, expressions, 
associations, interests, apparent lifestyle and dress."57 In order to manage these 
various cues, FTMs are advised (again through the "FTM Passing Tips" site) 
that "women tend to use an upward inflection at the end of their sentences, 
while men tend to speak in more of a monotone" and that "women tend to be 
less obtrusive, while men tend to take up more space." Specific instructions are 
included on the use of bathrooms: "just march calmly in, use the stall, and 
march calmly out . . . don't talk to anyone, don't make eye contact, and whatev- 
er you do, don't try to look at anyone's d i ~ k . " ~ ~  Handshakes, also, require spe- 
cific instructions: "make them firm, not like a dead fish. Lock your thumb into 
the other person's hand and look them in the eye. Don't pump exce~sively."~~ 
These are, of course, instructions that many men would at once recognize as 
implicit in their daily behaviour and interactions, and which might also be so 
intuitive that they are never even thought about. The point of examining FTM 
passing is to note that these are learned behaviours which are crucial in the suc- 
cessful performance of masculinity, regardless of how much they have become 
second-nature to men who do not have to learn how to be men during adult- 
hood. It may seem silly to add the injunction "if you see a guy in a bathroom, 
don't make eye contact. If you shake his hand outside, do" to a definition of 
hegemonic masculinity, but it is precisely the details of deportment-how you 
cany yourself, how you speak, how firm your grip is when you shake some- 
one's hand-that can make or break the performance of masculinity. A "large 
part of passing," the FTM Passing Tips site notes, "is sheer confidence and 
bravado. If you really believe you're a man and project this belief to the rest of 
the world, it will go a long way towards also convincing others. Any difficult 
feature you might have (high voice, smooth face, small shoulders, wide hips, 
lack of height, etc.) is one that some non-trans men have a l s e the re  are even 
non-trans men with enlarged chests (male gyne~omastia)."~~ Deportment, then, 
is the variable which makes masculinity especially difficult to define, especial- 
ly when the behaviour required in one context is exactly the opposite from what 
it is in another. It would take an exceptionally long list to describe every con- 
text in which a man might find himself, and the exact behaviour required of him 
Gesturing Towards Definition 57 
in that moment, and it is to be expected that most men will have failed to per- 
form the right behaviour at the right time at least once. We would have to con- 
clude that hegemonic masculinity is not only difficult to define because it 
requires different behaviour from different people (the degree of intellectuality 
or athleticism men should demonstrate), but also because it requires different 
behaviour from the same people at different times in their lives and in different 
contexts." To further complicate the problem of definition, FTM passing also 
shows that the behaviour which might be called 'masculine,' when exhibited by 
a man, may in fact be the same behaviour a woman exhibits under a different 
name. Dean Kotula, in his book The Phallus Palace, includes personal 
accounts by a number of post-operative transsexual men. One such man writes 
about the difference in people's perceptions of his behaviour as a woman and 
(post-transsexual surgery) as a man: "now, although my behaviour has changed 
little, people are far more accepting of me. The same behaviour that people 
once labelled 'brusque,' 'distant' or 'superior' is now interpreted as 'direct' and 
'assertive. A display of 'masculine' behaviour, in this case, does not aid in 
passing and, by extension, we might wonder whether the behaviour itself can 
properly be called masculine, if it is only interpreted as such in the context of 
certain readings of the body. A definition of masculinity would have to account 
for the interplay between the body and gendered behaviour-the body must be 
understood, not as separate from gender, and certainly not as the cause or ori- 
gin of gendered behaviour, but as a performance which informs the reading of 
gender. 
The disabled body, Rosemarie Thomson notes, has historically been asso- 
ciated with the female: "perhaps the founding association of femaleness with 
disability occurs in . . . Generation ofAnimaEs, Aristotle's discourse of the nor- 
mal and abnormal .. . In Book Two, Aristotle affirms [the] connection of dis- 
abled and female bodies by stating that 'the female is as it were a deformed 
male."'63 In a study of 1920s print advertising, Harlan Hahn finds that the con- 
flation of disability and the female "even permitted the belief that a male seat- 
ed in a wheelchair was not really a man."M Passing, for men with disabilities, 
is again a matter of transcending the female/'other' body and successfully per- 
forming 'maleness.' Lennard Davis notes that Antonio Gramsci, George Byron, 
Jorge Luis Borges and James Joyce all had disabilities, but "when one looks up 
these figures in dictionaries of biography . . . their physical disabilities are usu- 
ally not mentioned . . . There is an ableist notion at work here that anyone who 
creates a canonical work must be physically able."65 The disabled person "as 
conceived by the nondisabled world, has no abilities or social functions [and] 
. . . those who do perform successfully are no longer viewed as disabled."h6 We 
might, then, add great success as one of the features on the ever-growing list of 
items which should be included under 'hegemonic masculinity.' Success is, in 
fact, so salient a feature of masculinity that it can erase disability altogether, 
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while passing, as a daily matter of "keep[ing] up . . . [and not] taking too much 
sick time,"67 results, as with blackness, in a decrease in the saliency of one's 
identity as 'other.' Candice Lee writes: "I can't tell you the number of people 
who say, 'I just don't see you as disabled,' or 'I had met you three times before 
I noticed your braces' . . . I'm just a person, like them. Therefore, I must not be 
disabled. Not really."68 It is not to be imagined, however, that disability is so 
easily overlooked. Although Connell is clearly right in suggesting that the peo- 
ple who wield great power may be far from the hegemonic ideal in their private 
lives, this is accomplished either because the person's disability is not visible 
(when, for example, we read a book they have written), or, as in the case of F. 
D. Roosevelt, because the visual aspects of disability are very carefully man- 
aged. Davis relates in detail how Roosevelt, disabled by polio, made sure never 
to be photographed in a wheelchair, or to be seen being carried up stairs or using 
c~u tches .~~  On one occasion 
when Roosevelt was being lifted out of a car, some newsreel cameramen were 
filming the event and Roosevelt said, 'No movies of me getting out of the 
machine, boys.' The Secret Service would intervene if any photographers 
attempted to take such photos, and they would seize and expose the film. This 
was official government action to erase any visual trace of the President's dis- 
ability.?' 
This is obviously an extreme example of the way in which (a great deal of) 
power and success allowed one man to manage his performance of hegemonic 
masculinity, regardless of how 'un-hegemonic' his embodiment was in private. 
In fact, his encounter with polio and rehabilitation was characterized as a "tri- 
umph over physical disability"-making Roosevelt's public self-presentation 
arguably more hegemonic than that of a man who had never proven himself 
capable of mastering his body to such a degree." 
My reading of passing, thus far, has contributed the following items as 
definitive of hegemonic masculinity: it is white, ChristianProtestant, intellec- 
tual, athletic, 'healthy'/'able-bodied,' middle-class, muscular, and tall. Thus 
far, Goffman's definition of the 'one, complete, un-blushing male,' cited earli- 
er, seems like quite an accurate picture of masculinity, even if we do not know 
to what degree each of these characteristics must be embodied in order to qual- 
ify the whole of the performance as 'masculinity.' However, I have also shown 
that masculinity requires different behaviours at different times and in different 
contexts and that the definition becomes especially convoluted when we con- 
sider the category I have called 'deportment.' We are also faced with the prob- 
lem that the body, in relation to behaviour, is sometimes salient, sometimes not, 
and sometimes a factor which determines how behaviour is read. Finally, the 
very factors, which I have been exposing as aspects of masculinity, also make 
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it internally contradictory-denying masculinity to Jewish men because of hav- 
ing too much intellectuality, and to black men for not having enough. Davis' 
discussion of the visibility of disability further complicates the difficulty of def- 
inition. Davis writes, 
some disabilities disappear [in the space of email]: the Deaf, for example, or 
people using wheelchairs with other physical limitations, are not disabled . . . 
When speaking on the telephone with a person who uses a wheelchair I have 
no way of knowing if that person is unable to walk . . . the Deaf are perceived 
as such because one hears a different speech inflection or sees sign language. 
Without those sensory clues, the Deaf are embedded in the sensory grid of the 
'normal' person. To a passerby on the street, the Deaf person is indistinguish- 
able from anyone else until he or she begins to engage in cornmunicati~n.~~ 
Disability passing, then, gives us insight into the specificity of lack and its rela- 
tionship to 'passing.' As I have noted with respect to Jewish and black passing, 
there seems to be a relationship between a person's purported 'lack' and what 
they need to do in order to pass. Davis' discussion serves to remind us that lack, 
itself, is more salient in some contexts than others (we would also do well to 
remember that some kinds of 'lack,' such as a want of athleticism, might be 
salient in fewer situations than others, such as race.) In the context of masculin- 
ity this is not necessarily that informative. We would probably assume that a 
man who felt he was not athletic enough would attempt to build muscle in order 
to seem more athletic, or might over-emphasize his competitiveness or aggres- 
siveness on the playing field in order to affirm his athleticism, or might become 
an avid armchair enthusiast, lending his support to the local team, thereby 
demonstrating his commitment to such 'manly' athletic pursuits. Again, how- 
ever, the performance of masculinity is not that simple. In an article entitled 
"Masculinity in the Age of AIDS: HIV-Seropositive Gay Men and the 'Buff 
Agenda,"' Perry Halkitis shows that a muscular, 'masculine' physique can be 
used as a tool by some HIV-positive gay men in order to pass.73 They are not 
using muscularity to pass as 'masculine' or straight, however, but to pass as 
'healthy,' or HIV-negative. We are faced with two further problems here: first- 
ly, the specificity of lack does not determine what is needed to 'pass7-'mas- 
culinity' is deployed to produce a reading of 'health'-and secondly, we can 
hardly consider 'able-bodied' as one of the defining features of masculinity, as 
a subordinate term, when one can, in fact, stand in for the other (a process we 
have also seen in the case of class and sex). Clearly, a different approach is 
required. I have, thus far, been taking a semantic approach to the problem of 
defining masculinity. I will turn now to a discursive approach. 
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Hegemonic Embodiment 
We have seen not only that being middle-class, white, intellectual, 'able-bod- 
ied,' and athletic can 'stand in' for maleness or masculinity, but that blackness, 
Jewishness, and disability 'stands in' for the female. It follows, then, that there 
is no difference that we can reasonably define semantically. An attempt to 
define the content of any one term will fail, not only because of the gradations 
which are possible within each kind of difference (there will always be some- 
one who is taller, smarter, more athletic), nor because behaviour is contextual, 
and read in relation to the body. The ultimate failure of definition lies in the 
fact that whiteness can as easily be defined as male and middle-class, as mas- 
culinity can be defined as white and middle-class and so on. To attempt such a 
definition, a content-based definition, is to assert that there is one kind of dif- 
ference which is prior. It is tempting to suggest that the association of certain 
raciall'other' male bodies with the female is a sign that sexual difference is the 
ground on which all of our other understandings of difference is built, but, as 
Thomson's reading of the female in relation to disability suggests, we could as 
easily map sexual difference onto a pre-existing grid of the healthylcomplete 
body vs. the illlmutilated body. The reality is that difference is constructed in 
reference to difference in a non-linear way. Robert McRuer writes that the 
"consolidation [of disability and homosexuality] occurs through complex 
processes of conflation and stereotype: people with disabilities are often under- 
stood as somehow queer (as paradoxical stereotypes of the asexual or oversex- 
ual person with disabilities would suggest), while queers are often understood 
as somehow disabled (as an ongoing medicalization of identity, similar to what 
people with disabilities more generally encounter, would suggest)."74 If, as 
Dyer notes, the difference of class can be justified in relation to race75 and, as I 
have shown, the difference of race can be justified in relation to the female, and 
the difference of the female can be justified in relation to disability, and the dif- 
ference of disability can be justified in relation to homosexuality, and so forth, 
we must allow that it is difference itself which is prior. The 'reality' of biolog- 
ical difference, as Dyer shows, is based only on the need for difference, and is 
ultimately historical and cultural. "Some people," he writes, "[such as] the 
Irish, Latins, Jews-are white sometimes . . . For much of British history, the 
Irish have been looked down on as black," i.e. the biological attribution of race 
is written onto the body where difference is required for cultural or economic 
rea~ons.'~ Thomas DiPiero, similarly, writes that "we have installed [sexual dif- 
ference] in and through language as well as in and on bodies."" In Sexing the 
Body, Anne Fausto-Sterling conclusively demonstrated the way in which the 
body was 'sexed' through science (a process I would call 'scientific sexism') in 
response to the demands of first-wave feminism and suffrage movements, dur- 
ing the same historical period when the medicalization of difference sought to 
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distinguish biologically between races, classes, and cultures. Difference, or at 
least difference as we understand it today (with an implicit reference to 'biolo- 
gy'), is a result of science. "In the nineteenth-century," writes Nancy Stepan, 
"as attention turned increasingly to sexual and gender differences . . . gender 
was found to be remarkably analogous to race, such that the scientists could use 
racial difference to explain gender difference, and vice versa . . . In short, lower 
races represented the 'female' type of the human species and females the 'lower 
race' of gender."78 The use of analogy, Stepan argues, is intrinsic to biological 
science: "metaphors . . . [are] essential to scientific thought it~elf."'~ If we real- 
ly wish to arrive at a conception of hegemonic embodiment, then, we should 
return to the history of the categorization of bodies, based on difference, during 
the nineteenth century. 
Davis finds the answer to the question of hegemonic embodiment, not in 
nineteenth century biological science per se, but in the new discipline of statis- 
tics as used in relation to bodies. Davis writes that, as late as the seventeenth 
century, a cultural notion of the 'ideal' persisted, "as exemplified in the tradi- 
tion of nude Venuses, for example. This idea presents a mytho-poetic body that 
is linked to that of the gods . . . [and] is not attainable by a human . . . [There was] 
no demand that populations have bodies that conform to the ideal."s0 With the 
arrival of statistics, however, we suddenly encounter the idea of the 'normal' or 
a~erage.~ '  In 1835, Quetelet first noted that a method previously used in astron- 
omy, and known as 'the law of error', could be 
applied to the distribution of human features such as height and weight. He 
then took a further step of formulating the concept of ' l  'homme moyen ' or the 
average man.. .Quetelet's average man was a combination of 'I'homme moyen 
physique 'and 'Ihomme moyen morale, 'both a physically average and a moral- 
ly average construct.. .In formulating the idea of ' l  'homme moyen, ' Quetelet is 
also providing a justification for 'les classes moyens. ' With bourgeois hege- 
mony comes scientific justification for moderation and middle-class ideology. 
The average man, the body of the man in the middle, becomes the exemplar 
of the middle way of life.82 
According to Davis, the notion of the average or normal, paradoxically, became 
"a kind of ideal, a position devoutly to be wished. As Quetelet wrote, 'an indi- 
vidual who epitomized in himself, at a given time, all the qualities of the aver- 
age man, would represent at once all the greatness, beauty and goodness of that 
being."'R3 The problem with Quetelet's use of statistics was that it still under- 
stood everything that deviated from the statistical average (at either end of the 
bell curve) as 'error,' even when those traits were ones seen as positive-excep- 
tional intelligence, height, etc. To solve this dilemma, Sir Francis Galton 
renamed the error curve, calling it the 'normal' curve, and revised the way in 
which it was gra~hed.*~ He "created what he called an 'ogive,' which is 
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arranged in quartiles with an ascending curve that features the desired trait as 
'higher' than the undesirable deviati~n."~~ In this way, Galton succeeded in tak- 
ing the normal towards the ideal-in reinstating the idea of the ideal, but now 
with an attendant imperative to actually aspire towards it. The fourth quartile, 
the 'top end' of the curve, became the most normal-"the new ideal of ranked 
order [became] powered by the imperative of the norm."86 Davis' discussion of 
statistics provides a powerful argument for understanding hegemonic masculin- 
ity through the 'normal-as-ideal.' From this perspective, hegemonic masculine 
embodiment is indeed impossible, because such a person would have to be 
exceptional in every possible trait (physical, moral, emotional, behavioural) 
that could be graphed. It is for this reason, I believe, that "the nondisabled 
stance, like the white stance [and, I am arguing, the masculine stance] is veiled. 
'[It] cannot be said quite out loud or it loses its crucial position as a precondi- 
tion of ~ision."'~' If what we are talking about when we say 'masculinity' (or 
white or 'able-bodied') is not the normal-as-average, but the normal-as-ideal, 
then we have arrived at an understanding of the discursive (and scientific) con- 
struction of masculinity. We must still ask, however, what the relationship is 
between this ideal and 'masculinity' as it is lived. If the average is 'powered by 
the ideal,' then we cannot separate gender as it is performed, from gender as it 
is idealized. I believe that Davis' discussion of the historical circumstances and 
scientific processes that produce the normal-ideal actually describes the exact 
moment of the coming into being of the phallus, as Jacques Lacan describes it. 
As the ultimate 'precondition of vision,' or the universal signifier, the phallus 
is, I am suggesting, what we already mean when we say 'masculinity.' 
The Phallus 
As a "culturally universal structure of signification," Judith Butler writes, the 
phallus "is nowhere fully instantiated in the real."" Similarly, 
ideal able-bodied identity can never, once and for all, be achieved. Able-bod- 
ied identity and heterosexual identity are linked in their mutual impossibility 
and in their mutual incomprehensibility-they are incomprehensible in that 
each is an identity that is simultaneously the ground on which all identities 
supposedly rest and an impressive achievement that is always deferred and 
thus never really g~aranteed.~~ 
The impossibility and incomprehensibility of the categories effects a "consoli- 
dation of hegemonic identities," a consolidation which, I am arguing, is the 
phallus.90 It should be clear, then, that I am understanding the phallus as truly 
universal-as governing not only "the relations between the sexes," but 
between all bodies9' Following Daniel Boyarin, I am assuming that "the 
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FreudianILacanian reading of the condition of lack [with respect to the phallus] 
as being figured in the discourse of a particular culture as castration is most 
powerfully diagnostic of the effects of this culture, but only if we remember to 
read this figuration as the product of a particular culture."92 Indeed, I would 
wish to de-emphasize the relationship between castration and the phallus and to 
focus on the signification of the phallus and its relationship to (differential, 
embodied) lack, if only because the idea of castration, and indeed the term 
'phallus' itself, can cause an inaccurate emphasis on sexual difference, or an 
understanding of this difference as prior to other differences. If, as Butler 
writes, "men are said to 'have' the Phallus, yet never to 'be' it, in the sense that 
the penis is not equivalent to that Law," and if "women are said to 'be' the 
Phallus in the sense that they maintain the power to reflect or represent the 
'reality' of the self-grounding posture of the masculine subject,"93 then it is in 
the position of the woman, of being the phallus, that masculinity is signified. 
The phallus "speaks in the Other,"94 said Lacan, and throughout this paper I 
have been asking the other to speak, to reflect or represent masculinity through 
an understanding of its own lack, assuming, as DiPiero does, that "the identity 
in question cannot perform the taxonomically impossible task of defining 
itself."95 DiPiero, however, is speaking of whiteness, and notes that "white mas- 
culinity has asked those unlike itself to return to it an image of its identity."96 
The "African American or Latino," he writes, is "conscripted to tell the white 
man who or what the latter is, and to know more about his identity than he him- 
self apparently does."97 McRuer notes that the same process of reflection oper- 
ates with respect to able-bodied or heterosexual identity: "the parallel structure 
of the [Oxford English Dictionary] definitions of ability and sexuality is quite 
striking . . . to be able-bodied is to be 'free from physical disability,' just as to 
be heterosexual is to be 'the opposite of homosexual. Discursively, at least, 
the structure of difference and the way in which it signifies, remains the same. 
Which is to say that homosexual men, men of colour, Jewish men and disabled 
men are all put in the position of 'being' the phallus--of being women. They 
reflect the hegemonic ideal through a knowledge of their own lack, which is, at 
once, a knowledge of the ideal. 
Boyarin writes that this 
experience of a self doubling back on itself, observing itself, is psychoanalysis's 
primal encounter with the decentered self. [He] suggestrs] not that disadvantaged 
subjects-whether gay, female, colonized, black, or Jewish have a politically priv- 
ileged access to 'truth,' but that their disadvantage is a condition of their access to 
such understanding" and calls this the "epistemological advantage of the 'post- 
colonial subject' vis-a-vis the white male's imaginary possession of the phallus.99 
As I have shown in my discussion of passing, however, this understanding 
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is always fragmentary. The disadvantage (or lack), of the post-colonial subject 
is not only the 'condition of access,' it is also its limit. Or, to put it more sim- 
ply, and in the context of masculinity: one can only know masculinity to the 
extent that one does not measure up to it. If, as I have also shown, no one can 
measure u p i f  complete hegemonic embodiment, at all times and in all con- 
texts, is an impossibility--does that not put all men in the position of 'a self 
doubling back on itself,' with the attendant 'epistemological advantage,' inso- 
far as they fail in living up to masculinity, at least some of the time? This, 
indeed, is what Lacan seems to be saying: 
the fact that the phallus is a signifier means that it is in the place of the Other 
that the subject has access to it. But since this signifier is only veiled, as ratio 
of the Other's desire, it is this desire of the Other as such that the subject must 
recognize, that is to say, the other in so far as he is himself a subject divided 
by the signifying Spaltung [~plitting]. '~~ 
We have seen that the signifier is veiled, as Lacan writes, precisely because 
what it can signify is limited by lack-because it is in ratio to desire. But Lacan 
is clearly suggesting that all subjects are split-that they are, as Boyarin might 
say, 'colonized' by the phallus. Lacan writes that "man cannot aim at being 
whole once . . . . his relation as subject to the signifier [has been marked]."'0' I 
am suggesting, then, that masculinity, as it is lived, is a hybrid identity, defined 
by the "doubled cons~iousness"'~' of the post-colonial subject. 
In suggesting that lived masculinity is a condition of doubled conscious- 
ness, I am suggesting that it is a constant negotiation between 'being' and 'hav- 
ing' the phallus. I am not suggesting that men can 'be' the phallus through an 
embodiment of maleness-that the penis can be equivalent to the Law, as Butler 
said-but that they can, themselves, signify masculinity to the extent that they 
are split, to the extent of their own lack with respect to masculinity. By under- 
standing embodied masculinity in this way, I am addressing Connell's sugges- 
tion that men are subordinated by other men as a result of hegemonic masculin- 
ity (or the phallus). In material terms this means, not only, that the black man 
will signify for the white man, that he will reflect the white man's hegemonic 
masculinity, and, thereby allow the white man to seem to 'have' the phallus, but 
that a shorter man can signify, can 'be' the phallus, for a taller man, or that a 
less athletic man can do the same for one who is more so. At the same time, 
these men may appear to 'have' the phallus in their relations with men who are 
further than them from the normal-ideal (whatever it may be in a given context 
or, rather, whatever aspect of it may be salient at a particular time), i.e. whose 
lackldesire with respect to the phallus is greater. In suggesting that one man can 
be the phallus for another; I am necessarily also suggesting that one man desires 
the other. The subject (the tall man, in this rather simplistic example) desires 
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the Other (the short man) in order to have his 'masculinity' confirmed. His 
desire for the Other is a desire for the phallus, a desire to have the phallus, and 
it is only the presence of the Other's lack which makes this possible. I am not 
talking, here, about homosexual or homosocial desire, and any interpretation of 
it as such would fall victim to the tendency to leap to easy conclusions about 
what constitutes 'maleness' or 'masculinity.' The Other, in this context, is not 
masculine/male. In fact, Lacan's formulation does allow for a more nuanced 
understanding of sexual and, I would argue, all difference. Women are "those 
who, from a psychoanalytic perspective, are considered to be women, regard- 
less of their biological / genetic makeup."lo3 A "great many biological females 
turn out to have masculine structure, and a great many biological males turn out 
to have feminine structure."104 Of course this statement refers to the structuring 
of the subconscious by the phallus, for individual subjects, but I am suggesting 
that the phallus as universal signifier (of lack, of desire, of difference, of value) 
operates differentially and contextually in each relation between two people, 
and structures those relations. There is a way in which the relation I have used 
as an example can be understood as homosexual, but it is no more homosexual 
than it would be if the Other were a woman. A subject is always in the position 
of desiring the phallus, and therefore desiring the Other, and so it does not mat- 
ter whether the Other is physically 'male' or 'female.' In fact, regarding 
women, Lacan writes, "it is in order to be the phallus . . . that the woman will 
reject an essential part of her femininity . . . It is for what she is not that she 
expects to be desired."lo5 She (or any Other, regardless of biology/morphology) 
is desired by the subject for her masculinity-the masculinity that she is able to 
be for the subject (or one might say reflect), as a result of her own lack. Let me 
be perfectly clear-the short man in my example is not 'less masculine' than the 
subject. He is not Masculine at all. He is Other. He is, as Fanon said, not a 
man. 
I have given very simplistic examples in order to illustrate my argument of 
what might make a man 'be' the phallus in relation to one man, and 'have' the 
phallus in relation to another. It is worth remembering however, as I showed 
through the discussion of passing, that many factors contribute to the way in 
which masculinity is read, and that we cannot necessarily predict which kinds 
of lack will be salient in each context and what will be the determining factor 
in deciding whether a man 'has' the phallus with respect to another man. What 
my discussion should make clear is that Connell is wrong in suggesting that 
some men will reap the benefits of hegemonic masculinity, while others will be 
oppressed by it. As I have shown, it is possible (and likely) that a man will 
experience both benefits (to the extent that he seems to 'have' the phallus) and 
subordination (to the extent that he must 'be' the phallus), as a consequence of 
hegemonic masculinity. 
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Hybridity 
We are faced, still, with the problem that men can 'have' the phallus, at least in 
relation to an 'other' whose lack is greater than theirs. This is a problem, 
because it suggests that hegemonic embodiment actually is possible, if only 
relationally and contextually. Lacan writes, however, that there is an "interven- 
tion of a 'to seem' that replaces the 'to have,""06 an intervention which Butler 
understands as "a necessary or presuppositional impossibility to any effort to 
occupy the position of 'having' the Phallus, with the consequence that both 
positions of 'having' and 'being' are, in Lacan's terms, finally to be understood 
as comedical failures."'07 This means that masculinity is not split between 
lackl'being' the phallus on the one hand, and 'having' the phallus/hegemonic 
masculinity on the other. Instead, the split is between lack/'being7 and disavow- 
all'seeming.' Halberstam's distinction between 'realness' and the 'real' should 
clarify the distinction between 'having' and 'seeming': realness "is not exact- 
ly a performance, not exactly an imitation, it is the way that people appropriate 
the real and its effects . . . The real, on the other hand, is that which always exists 
elsewhere and as a fantasy of belonging."lo8 It is for this reason that I would 
suggest that all masculinity, as it is lived, is a form of passing. I am not sug- 
gesting that men do not feel themselves to be male or masculine. Quite the con- 
trary, I am understanding masculinity as similar to FTM passing, in that "FTMs 
and transmen feel they are being seen as their true selves in living, dressing and 
behaving as men,"lm yet may at once have an awareness of 'lack' and how it is 
being modified in order to project their 'true selves.' I would also like to return 
to Jewish passing, because Itzkovitz' exploration of the 'chameleonic Jew' is 
relevant here. If "the natural place of the Jew was in passing," as Itzkovitz 
wrote, I am suggesting that this is also the natural place of men/masculinity. 
This is not to say that success in 'seeming' or passing as hegemonically mascu- 
line (as the hegemonic body) is what determines the extent of one's masculini- 
ty-that would be a simple matter of conforming to an ideal. Rather, it is the 
relationship between lack and the performance of aspects of the hegemonic 
'natural-ideal' that is important, because any successful 'seeming' is at once a 
disavowal of lack. The subject is still split. Regardless of how closely the ideal 
is approximated the self is still, to some extent, doubling back on itself, observ- 
ing itself in relation to the hegemonic ideal. It is the very hybridity of passing, 
the result of colonization by the phallus, which defines lived masculinity. 
It should not be imagined that my analysis of lived masculinity as passing, 
or as Lacan's 'seeming,' is a suggestion that hegemonic masculinity is experi- 
enced as false, or that the fact that "masculinity is built around an anxiety of 
in~ufficiency""~ means that it is fragile, or any the less hegemonic. The 'seem- 
ing' of masculinity does 'pass' as hegemonic, and the benefits of money, power 
etc. that accrue to individual bodies on that basis are material. In fact, it is the 
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very 'seeming' which re-produces the hegemonic ideal. Stoltenberg writes that 
"people born with penises must strive to make the idea of male sexual identity 
personally real by doing certain deeds and actions that are valued and chosen 
. . . we all keep striving to make the idea real.""' Stoltenberg is talking about the 
individual's need to feel personally 'real' as male/masculine-the individual's 
desire for 'realness,' as Halberstam would say. This 'striving,' however, does 
'make the idea real,' insofar as it continually reproduces it. This assertion is not 
new-it draws on Butler's exploration of performativity and repetition in 
Gender Trouble. By placing this idea in the context of passing and what it has 
told us about masculinity and lack, however, I am seeking to elaborate the point 
a little. Insofar as we can deduce what is contained in the ideal hegemonic body 
(through an examination of individuals' lack with respect to it), I have shown 
that it is not only vast, but also fragmentary, internally contradictory and that it 
differs between times and contexts. As Demetriou writes, "the masculinity that 
occupies the hegemonic position at a given historical moment is a hybrid bloc 
that incorporates diverse and apparently oppositional  element^.""^ Therein lies 
its strength. Connell writes: 
There is an ordering of versions of femininity and masculinity at the level of 
the whole society . . . [but] the possibilities of variation, of course, are vastly 
greater. The sheer complexity of relationships involving millions of people 
guarantees that ethnic differences and generational differences as well as class 
patterns come into play. But in key respects the organization of gender on the 
very large scale must be more skeletal and simplified than the human relation- 
ships in face-to-face milieux. The forms of femininity and masculinity consti- 
tuted at this level are stylized and impoverished. Their interrelation is centred 
on a single structural fact, the global dominance of men over women."' 
Hegemonic masculinity, I am suggesting, is not at all 'stylized and impover- 
ished'; on the contrary, it is rich and diverse. Moreover, I have shown that the 
subordination of 'ethnic,' 'generational,' and 'class' differences to sedgender 
difference is not only fallacious, but also does not aid in our understanding of 
sedgender. We cannot, with respect to the hegemonic body/normal-ideal, 
attempt to piece out, in a pseudo-scientific way, one area of inquiry and expect 
to draw any adequate conclusions. The 'single structural fact' of the global 
dominance of men over women can, based on my examination of masculinity, 
just as easily be re-cast as the single structural fact of the global dominance of 
white over black, able-bodied over disabled, or rich over poor. The strength or 
'hegemony' of the ideal lies exactly in its ability to signify, which is to say, in 
its ability to differentiate and, more importantly, to rank or assign value to any 
body, and to any two bodies in relation to each other. This understanding of the 
hegemonic ideal brings us back to how repetition re-produces the ideal and 
makes it real. It also explains why it should be that the hegemonic ideal is "a 
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symptomatic reply to cultural demands, not . . . a self-generating ahistorical 
entity somehow able endlessly to reproduce itself."'I4 We cannot predict, with 
any accuracy, what the outcome of differentiation or signification, based on the 
hegemonic ideal will be. This is because the ideal is "in a constant process of 
negotiation, translation, hybridization, and recon'iigurati~n."'~~ It is also 
because the relationship between lack, and the way in which an individual com- 
pensates for it, is not always direct and because the aspects of hegemonic or 
'other' identity that are salient in each individual body are contextual. What I 
mean is that the benefits of 'seeming' to be hegemonically masculine do not 
always accrue to individual bodies in predictable ways. This, DiPiero writes, is 
why "white males are so often angry [they are] sustaining the contradiction 
between how the culture defines them and how they experience their  live^.""^ 
When benefits do not accrue to individual (white, male, middle-class, able-bod- 
ied, heterosexual) bodies, there is always an aspect of the hegemonic ideal we 
can point to and say 'they didn't measure up,' especially because that ideal is 
internally contradictory. The failure of individuals, then, reflects no failure onto 
the hegemonic ideal. On the other hand, when a body (despite its 'other' status 
in terms of race, class, etc.) does experience great (political, economic, artistic, 
intellectual) success, there is always an aspect of the hegemonic ideal into 
which we can slot them. We can say they had exceptional strength of charac- 
ter, great perseverance and so forth (in short, that they succeeded, as we saw in 
the case of Fanon, because they were 'really' white, on the 'inside'). The fact 
that the hegemonic ideal can change, then (that it can sometimes look black, for 
example) is a result of the individual differences in the bodies which repeat or 
perform it. Whether the changes in the hegemonic ideal actually occasion any 
real positive effects, any material difference in the way that power is distributed 
(even if it occasionally defies our expectations of to whom it should be distrib- 
uted), is a subject for another paper. For the purposes of this paper, however, it 
should suffice to note that it is entirely possible that the 'hybridity' of the hege- 
monic ideal only "ensure[s] the reproduction of patriar~hy.""~ 
In conclusion, I would like to consider how to proceed with masculinity 
studies. There is, at least in western culture, only one masculinity. That it is 
hybrid and changes over time does not alter its structure. Its relationship to 
bodies and its ability to signify remains the same. We would also do well to 
keep in mind that masculinity is a hegemonic ideal, that it is at once the signi- 
fier of race, class, sex, and ability, and that any attempt to analyze one aspect 
without reference to the others obscures the processes of differentiation, signi- 
fication, and the distribution of power as they relate to all bodies. This kind of 
constant vigilance with respect to difference may seem like a daunting task, but 
I think we can address it by asking different questions. From the perspective of 
studying literature or film (if only because this paper is being written in an 
English department), I think we should focus on the relationship between bod- 
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ies and the salience of lack in masculinity studies. We might ask, who seems 
to embody the ideal masculinity in a given text, and why? Is he the ideal in 
every context, and in relation to every other person in the text? Is there some- 
one who seems to fall short of hegemonic masculinity? What does he lack? 
How does he compensate for this lack? Is he hegemonically masculine in some 
contexts, but not in others, and why? Which aspects of hegemonic masculini- 
ty are most salient or important in the text? What kinds of power are distrib- 
uted on the basis of this version of hegemonic masculinity? Is power distrib- 
uted differentially across contexts, and for what reason? What is the relation- 
ship between behaviour and the body? Does one inform the other? Is the 
behaviour at odds with our expectations of that particular body in that particu- 
lar context? How does the behaviour change our reading of the body, and vice 
versa? This is by no means an exhaustive list of questions and, although I have 
framed them in relation to literary studies, I see no reason why these questions 
could not be taken up in the context of sociological studies on masculinity. 
Finally, I would suggest that we limit our use of the term 'masculinities.' 
It is, as I have shown, not at all useful in considering 'masculinity' in western 
culture, because there is only one masculinity. I am also unconvinced of the 
term's usefulness for cross-cultural work. I am by no means suggesting that the 
expectations of men's behaviour in all cultures be studied in relation to a west- 
em, hegemonic ideal; instead I think we should keep in mind that what we are 
studying when we study the behaviour of men in other cultures may not be mas- 
culinity at all. The behaviour exhibited by men may have much more to do with 
their age, their class, their occupation, their situation within their family, that 
family's relationship to the community etc., than the 'fact' that they are 'men.' 
It is confusing, not to mention Euro-centric, to discuss 'masculinities' with 
respect to people whose behaviour may be subject to an entirely different struc- 
ture of signification. This is a call for greater vigilance in cross-cultural work 
through attention to culturally specific systems of signification. Even in post- 
colonial work, where the legacy of colonialism has left a trace of the phallus on 
a prior system of signification we should remember that these are not necessar- 
ily instances of two versions of 'masculinity' bumping up against each other, 
but masculinity bumping up against something else entirely. Ultimately, we 
would do well to remember that 'masculinity' is not a construct that describes 
the behaviour of men. It is a culturally specific term, with a specific, western 
ontology in studies of biological difference. 
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